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PROFESSOR ROTHENBERG'S PROPOSED SOLUTION FOR
NATIONAL EMERGENCY DISPUTES: A REPLY
BY RICHARD A. GIVENS*
In the October 1960 issue of the Dickinson Law Review, Professor I.
Herbert Rothenberg proposed a solution to the problem of national emergency
disputes. He suggested that, when an emergency dispute arose, a national
poll should be conducted, at least in part at the expense of the parties, to
determine whether or not the public wishes the strike to continue.' This
proposal would seem to have no practical chance of adoption. But it is
interesting and merits discussion because it draws upon the basic deterrent
to irresponsible acts by either party in a national emergency dispute, namely
the potentiality of restrictions upon the parties being imposed by demands
from the public. However, the proposal makes no provision for the means
by which the dispute would be settled or for the terms on which it would
be settled. This constitutes a fatal defect which makes the proposal itself
at best unworkable, and at worst harmful because it conceals the true nature
of the problem. At the same time, however, its presentation serves the
important purpose of focusing attention upon one of the realities facing the
parties in emergency disputes, namely that unless they act responsibly,
public opinion will ultimately impose severe restrictions to protect itself from
the effects of such disputes.
A national emergency dispute is not merely a strike, but also a dispute
between two parties seeking to impose their respective demands as to the
conditions of employment in the industry. Professor Rothenberg's suggestion for a referendum presenting the question of "whether the public wishes
or does not wish the strike to continue . . .-2 ignores the fact that a dispute
is involved and treats the problem as being merely the strike itself. This
fundamental error is not a new one. On the contrary, it was made in our
early treatment of national emergency disputes in the past. The first great
national emergency dispute arose on the railroads in 1877 when strikes spread
spontaneously without union direction in protest against wage cuts, and
3
led to rioting which was put down with the assistance of federal forces.
The second nationwide emergency dispute was the Pullman railway strike
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1. National Emergency Dispute: A Proposed Solution, Excerpts From Correspondence Between Senator John L. McClellan and I. Herbert Rothcuberg, 65 DICK.

L. REV. 1 (1960), also reprinted in 12 LAB. L.J. 108 (1961).
2. Id. at 12.
3. See DULLES, LABOR IN AMERICA 118-122 (1949); BRUCE, 1877: YEAR OF
VIOLENCE (1959); Goldman, Book Review, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1959, § 7 (Book
Review), 6, 24.
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of 1894, which led to an injunction not merely against violence but against
any effort to persuade the employees not to work. 4 The injunction was upheld
by the Supreme Court on the ground that the strike unreasonably interfered
with interstate commerce, and that under the circumstances this justified
injunctive relief action even without express statutory authority. 5
This approach of dealing with emergency disputes as strikes alone with
no effort to deal with the underlying dispute, however, led to great bitterness
and was one of the sources of a determined campaign against "government
by injunction" which led to the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in
1932.6 Even before 1932, however, our approach to national emergency
disputes was drastically revised. A third national railway dispute arose in
1916 over the issue of the eight-hour day. The unions demanded an eighthour day with no reduction in wages and the employers declined to agree.
Congress responded by enacting the Adamson Act 7 which made the eighthour day mandatory. It further provided that no reduction in wages should
occur during a temporary period while the operation of the plan was studied
by a commission.8 This constituted a striking departure from the approach
in the 1894 railway dispute because the legislation dealt with the substantive
issues involved in the dispute rather than merely seeking to deal with the
strike which was the symptom of the dispute. It was thus recognized that a
national emergency dispute was a dispute between two parties rather than
merely a strike by the employees, and accordingly, that both elements of the
problem had to be dealt with for an effective solution.
This recognition was applied in the Railway Labor Act passed by
Congress in 1926 to deal with future' disputes on the railroads.9 That
statute provided machinery for seeking to settle disputes before a strike
became necessary.
When in 1946 a railway strike occurred despite the procedures set up by
the Railway Act, President Truman responded by seeking drastic legislation
which would among other things have permitted him to draft railway
strikers into the Army. 10 This bill was rapidly passed by the House, but
4. United States v. Debs, 64 Fed. 724, 727, item 7 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1894).
5. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
6. Labor Disputes Act (Norris-LaGuardia), 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 16110, 113-15 (1958) ; see United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941) ; FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
7. Hours of Service Act (Adamson), 39 Stat. 721 (1916), 45 U.S.C. § 65 (1958).
8. The Adamson Act was upheld in Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917).
9. Railroad Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151-188
(1958); see Murphy, Agreement on the Railroads, The Joint Railway Conference of
1926, 11 LAB. L.J. 823 (1960).
10. See 92 CONG. REc. 5754-62 (1946). Serious questions under the thirteenth
amendment might have been raised. Cf. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911);
Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1941).
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was blocked in the Senate largely through the restraining influence of
Senator Robert Taft." It is clear that the possibility of legislation of some
sort, should the strike have continued, was of great importance in its settlement.
The post-war coal strike of 1946 was terminated by an injunction during
a government seizure under a World War II seizure statute, but authorization for seizure was not continued.' 2 When the President sought to seize
the steel mill on his own authority in 1952, the Supreme Court held the
action beyond his powers where Congress had provided for emergency
dispute procedures in the Taft-Hartley Act but omitted any seizure authority. 13 The strike resumed after the seizure ended, and was settled only
after its effect upon our defense effort made it clear that it could not con14
tinue.
The steel dispute of 1959 was settled before the expiration of an
eighty-day injunction under the national emergency provisions of the TaftHartley Act, after the strike had continued for a considerable time before
the Act was invoked. It is plain that in this case the possibility of further
legislation should the strike continue was also of great importance in the
settlement.' 5
The basic philosophy of the Taft-Hartley Act emergency provisions, as
well as the Railway Act, ultimately rely upon voluntary settlement supported
by the possibility of further Congressional action should no dispute be achieved
after the specified procedures have been exhausted. The Taft-Hartley Act
specifically provides for a report to Congress at the expiration of an eightyday injunction which could deal with recommendations for further action
affecting the parties to the dispute. 16
The approach of utilizing the possibility of further governmental action,
not specified in advance, as a means of seeking to induce the parties
to act responsibly is a utilization of what Professor Adolf Berle has
called our "inchoate law.' 7 Even where no explicit limitations on private
action have been enacted by the legislature or laid down by judicial
11. See 92 CONG. REC. 5780-81, 5843-58; 5968-75, 5988 (1946); Student Analysis,
The Legal Framework for Public Intervention in Industrial Disputes, 35 NOTRE DAME
LAW.

654, 686-87 (1960).

12. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
13. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
14. See Enarson, The Politics of an Emergency Dispute: Steel, 1952, in BERNSTEIN,
ENARSON & FLEMING, EMERGENCY DISPUTES AND NATIONAL POLICY (1958) at 46, 71.
15. See Seidman, National Emergency Strike Legislation, in SLOVENKO, A SYMPOSIUM ON LABOR RELATIONS LAW (1961).
16. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley), 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29

U.S.C. § 180 (1958).
17. See BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY 91-93 (1959) ; Berle, Legal Problems
of Economic Power, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 4, 7-8 (1960); cf. Givens, Parallel Business
Conduct Under the Sherman Act, 5 ANTITRUST BULL. 273, 284-85, 291 (1960).
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decisions, it may be quite clear that should private conduct of a certain type
occur, a reaction on the part of the public would follow and legal restrictions
would be imposed in some manner. This is itself a form of regulation. This
approach also has the important advantage of preserving flexibility, leaving
open a wide choice of possible procedures at the time of a future emergency.' 8
For these reasons, the author has argued that the ultimate sanctions to
be applied in a future national emergency dispute settlement should not be
spelled out in advance; rather the possibility of further Congressional action
should be left open after the exhaustion of preliminary procedures.' 9 The
undesirability of spelling out precise detailed alternatives in advance is
heightened by the fact that none of the existing alternatives for compulsory
20
settlement is free from severe drawbacks.
Professor Rothenberg's proposal draws upon the deterrence of the
impact upon the public opinion of a continued emergency dispute, but it falls
into the error which we made in 1894 of dealing with an emergency dispute
merely as a strike and not as a dispute with the strike being a symptom.
It goes without saying that the public would prefer an emergency strike
not to continue. The suggested referendum would merely demonstrate that
truism. The real question would remain-on what terms should the dispute
be settled ? It is also clear that the public would prefer that the parties work
out their own settlement. The necessity of holding a referendum, on the
other hand, would suggest that some form of compulsory settlement would
be contemplated. But by what means and on what basis? If no answer is
provided, the entire procedure has brought us no nearer to a solution of our
difficulties. Professor Rothenberg may contemplate that the strike itself
should be terminated as a result of the wishes of the public as expressed in
the proposed referendum, without any further concern for settlement. This
would amount to saying that the dispute should be resolved by the employees
simply abandoning whatever demands had originally led them to strike,
regardless of their merits. Such an attempt to impose a settlement on the
terms sought by one party to a dispute with no determination of the merits
would not be durable or workable. And it is to be noted that Professor
18.

See Wirtz, The "Choice of Procedures" Approach to National Emergency
BERNSTEIN, ENARSON & FLEMING, EMERGENCY DISPUTES AND NATIONAL
POLICY 149-65 (1955);
Kramer, Emergency Strikes, 11 LAB. L.J. 232-34 (1960);
Report of Special Committee, Department of the Church and Economic Life, National
Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., In Search of Maturity in Industrial
Relations: Some Long-Range Ethical Implications of the 1959-60 Dispute in the Steel
Industry 10-15 (1960) ; cf. N.Y. Times, October 14, 1960, p. 20, col. 8 (Remarks of
Senator Kennedy).
19. Givens, Dealing with National Emergency Labor Disputes, 34 TEMP. L.Q.
17 (1960).
Disputes,

20.

Compare Cole, The Role of the Government in Emergency Dis'putes, 26

L.Q. 375 (1953).

TEMP.

PROPOSED SOLUTION

1961]

Rothenberg did not spell out whether this is what he has in mind. Rather
the question which he would put to a vote in a national referendum would
merely be whether the public wishes the strike to continue, with Delphic
silence as to what means should be used to end the strike and whether or
not they would involve any settlement of the underlying dispute.
Professor Rothenberg's suggestion, despite its unworkability, does seek
to draw upon the basic factor of the demand of the public for some form of
settlement, and the potentialities for more drastic public intervention which
this implies as an independent means of dealing with the emergency. And it
might be desirable to make this factor clear to the parties in concrete form
at the time of the emergency dispute through some form of procedure. A
referendum could not feasibly satisfy the purpose of such a form of procedure
because it does not permit the formulation of alternatives in the light of the
specific facts of the dispute. Rather, it would result in merely a "yes-or-no"
answer to a predetermined question drawn up without contemplation of the
particular facts involved, and hence would not be an effective means of dealing with a particular dispute. 21 Any more appropriate means would necessarily involve an examination of the particular facts in the dispute itself.
One way in which this might be accomplished would be to permit
Presidential emergency boards under the Taft-Hartley Act to make recommendations of possible settlement terms. This would generate pressure for
the parties to reach some solution, and would place at least some onus on
the party rejecting the recommended settlement terms. 22 Should this prove
insufficient, a second step might be for the emergency board to be authorized
to make recommendations to the President of possible legislation which he
might propose to the Congress should no settlement be reached. The TaftHartley Act might well be amended to empower a fact-finding board to
make recommendations of either or both types.
However, even in the absence of express statutory authority, the President would be empowered to appoint an outside board of experts to advise
him concerning possible settlement terms or concerning legislation which he
might recommend to Congress.
Should these measures prove insufficient, a further ad hoc measure short
of ultimate permanent compulsory settlement might be the imposition of a
temporary period during which the recommendations of an emergency board
would be mandatory on both parties. 23 Such a drastic measure would be
21. Cf. LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION, ch. XIV (1922).
22. See Report of Special Committee, Department of the Church and Economic
Life, National Council Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., In Search of Maturity in
Industrial Relations: Some Long Range Ethical Implications of the 1959-60 Dispute in
the Steel Industry 14-15 (1960).
23.

Givens, Dealing with National Emergency Labor Disputes, 34 TEMP. L.Q.

17, 33-41 (1960).
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undesirable unless it proved absolutely necessary, and therefore, it should
not be authorized in advance by any statute enacted before an actual emergency necessitated such action. However, should an emergency reach the
point where further compulsory legislation of some sort was an absolute
necessity, then authorization of a temporary mandatory period might be
preferable to the other compulsory settlement devices which have been
discussed.

24

Professor Rothenberg's suggestion of a referendum should serve as a
valuable stimulant to discussion of these difficult issues by focusing attention
on the importance of the eventual demands of the public as the ultimate sanction for settlement of emergency disputes. The reality of the matter is that
the parties must settle such disputes between themselves before the impact on
the nation becomes too severe, or else more drastic intervention will result.
The parties already know this in each case. Further means of making it clear
in the context of the specific emergency dispute might nevertheless be
valuable. Professor Rothenberg's suggestion is interesting because it points
this out in a way which is spectacular because of the novelty of his idea.
His actual proposal, however, ignores the lesson which should be drawn
from our experience with national emergency disputes in the past-namely
that they are disputes as well as merely strikes. His referendum proposal
should therefore not be adopted because it provides no machinery for dealing
with the ways in which the dispute itself, which is the source of the national
emergency strike, may be resolved.
24. Id. at 22-23.

